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ABSTRACT
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) revolutionized the world of
securities law whistleblowing. It encouraged employees to reveal corporate fraud
by providing federal anti-retaliation protection to incentivize such reports.
Securities law whistleblowing was transformed a second time in 2010 when
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Under Dodd-Frank, employees that report information to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are not only provided federal antiretaliation protections but also are eligible for a hefty bounty. Two major
differences separate these statutes: (1) SOX is limited to employees of companies
who are subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, but DoddFrank is not; and (2) SOX provides federal anti-retaliation protection for internal
reporting, but Dodd-Frank does not. As a result, employees of companies that are
not subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act (“private
employees”) are now faced with the choice to either (1) report internally, receive
no federal anti-retaliation protection, and be ineligible for a federal bounty; or (2)
to report to the SEC, receive federal anti-retaliation protection, and also become
eligible for a federal bounty of at least ten percent of sanctions imposed. Thus, a
well–informed whistleblower is left with no choice—he should bypass internal
reporting procedures and report directly to the SEC. This Article examines the
problems associated with this “private company loophole” in more detail. In
particular, it argues that if Congress provides a federal bounty and federal antiretaliation protection to private employee whistleblowers that report to the SEC, it
should also provide federal anti-retaliation protection to private employee
whistleblowers that report internally.
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Enron changed everything. The fall of Enron destroyed the livelihoods of
2
20,000 employees and tainted the public’s trust in American corporations.
Immediately thereafter, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
3
4
(“SOX”), which afforded public company whistleblower employees anti5
retaliation protection for reporting violations of federal securities laws. The hope

1
Enron: The Fraud that Changed Everything, INDEP. (Apr. 09, 2006), http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/enron-the-fraud-that-changed-everything-473374.html.
2
Id.
3
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
4
When used in this Article, “public” refers to a corporation that is subject to the reporting
requirements in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) because the company is
either required to register under section 12 of the Exchange Act or required to file reports under section
15(d) of the Exchange Act. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78mm (2006).
5
Id.
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was that if honest employees were afforded federal anti-retaliation protections,
they would be motivated to report corporate wrongdoing and prevent a disaster,
6
such as Enron, from reoccurring. After the financial crisis of 2008, Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”), which expanded securities-related whistleblower protections in many
7
ways. Even with the increased protections provided in these statutes, anti8
9
retaliation protections fall short for private companies and their whistleblower
employees. This Article examines the current state of the law and proposes a
solution to the private company loophole created by these statutes.
Part II examines a whistleblower’s position in corporate governance. Part III
describes a case that involves the private company loophole set forth in Part IV.
Part IV explains the private company loophole. This loophole results from current
federal law providing anti-retaliation protection to private company whistleblowers
if they report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), but not if
they report internally.
Parts V through VII describe why the federal government should provide
private company employees protection for internal reporting. Part V argues that
such protection is warranted because private companies are already subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws and that the protection is
necessary in light of the incentives Dodd-Frank gives private company
whistleblowers to report to the SEC. Next, Part VI suggests that the current state
of the law will confuse prospective private company whistleblowers and, in turn,
will undermine Dodd-Frank’s goals. Additionally, Part VII argues that without
internal reporting protection, the incentives Dodd-Frank gives well-informed
private employees to report to the SEC will destroy private companies’ internal
compliance systems.
Part VIII proposes a solution to the private company loophole created by
Dodd-Frank. Most importantly, it urges Congress to adopt federal anti-retaliation
protections for private company whistleblowers that report internally.

6

See generally S. REP NO. 107-146 (2002).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
8
When used in this Article, “private” refers to a company that is neither required to register under
section 12 of the Exchange Act nor is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
See generally Securities Act of 1933 § 78a–78mm.
9
When used in this Article, “whistleblower” refers to an employee who informs the authorities
concerning a federal securities law violation. There are whistleblower protections in many other
areas—health, safety, etc.—that apply to both privately held and publicly held companies. See The
Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LAB. (Mar. 03, 2012),
http://www.whistleblowers.gov/index.html (stating the various whistleblower statutes enforced by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)). Due to the traditional public policy
determination that public investors justify federal securities laws, protections for private company
securities-related whistleblowers have not been as thoroughly addressed as in other whistleblower
categories. Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities:
An Agency Theory of Broker-Dealer Liability, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 585 (2005). Unless otherwise
indicated, this Article only addresses securities-related whistleblower protections, which is why there is
a public-private dichotomy throughout it. See infra Part V.A. for more detail.
7
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II. A WHISTLEBLOWER’S FUNCTION IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Value-Add
Whistleblowers, as the corporation’s conscience, are the essential element in
revealing and preventing corporate fraud. “[T]he best way to fight financial fraud
10
is to incentivize and protect whistleblowers.” Understanding this truth is even
more important in recent years as corporate securities fraud has become
11
increasingly sophisticated. According to the Fiscal Year 2011 Annual Report on
the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, market manipulation (16.2%), corporate
disclosures and financial statements (15.3%), and offering fraud (15.6%) were the
12
most commonly reported securities frauds in fiscal year 2011.
The role whistleblowers play in preventing and detecting fraud is more than
conceptual. A study conducted by Professor Alexander Dyck of the University of
Toronto and two of his colleagues at the University of Chicago provides statistical
13
evidence that employees are instrumental in revealing corporate fraud. Professor
Dyck analyzed corporate frauds in large United States companies from 1996 to
2004. With a sample size of 216 Professor Dyck found that the SEC revealed 7%
of frauds; auditors, 10%; industry regulators, 13%; equity holders, 3%; the media,
14
13%; and employees, with the largest percentage, 17%.
The main reason whistleblower employees are important to revealing
corporate securities fraud is because whistleblower employees have better
15
institutional knowledge than external monitors, such as auditors. The majority of
information that inside employees possess regarding a corporation is unavailable to
16
the public or external monitors. Moreover, very few frauds could be committed

10

Jordan Thomas, a former SEC lawyer. Brooke Masters, Enron’s Fall Raised the Bar in
Regulation, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9790ea78-1aa9-11e1-ae1400144feabdc0. html#axzz2AAAThdcD.
11
“‘Enron changed everything,’ said Jordan Thomas, a former [SEC] lawyer. ‘Because of how
challenging the Enron fraud was, how document-intensive and time consuming, it . . . led to far more
sophisticated accounting fraud teams at the SEC. It raised the bar for law enforcement.’” Masters,
supra note 10.
12
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM, 5 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-report2011.pdf.
13
I.J. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2213–14 (2010).
14
Id. at 2213–15. Other studies have found an even higher correlation between employeewhistleblowing and corporate fraud revelation. For example, in a 2007 study PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PWC) found that internal controls were not enough to detect corporate fraud. Upon finding that 43%
of corporate fraud was exposed by “whistleblowing related activities,” PWC stated that encouraging
whistleblowers to report wrongdoing is a necessity. STEPHEN M. KOHN, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS
CTR., WHY WHISTLEBLOWING WORKS AND WHAT CONGRESS MUST DO ABOUT IT, 2 (2007), available
at http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/whistleblower%20conference%20
policy%20paper%20final.pdf.
15
Rachel Beller, Whistleblower Protection Legislation of the East and the West: Can it Really
Reduce Corporate Fraud and Improve Corporate Governance?, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 873, 880 (2011);
Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 13, at 23.
16
Jisso Kim, Confession of a Whistleblower: The Need to Reform the Whistleblower Provision of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 241, 250 (2010); Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra
note 13, at 23.
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17

without some employee participation.

B. Anti-Retaliation Protections—Essential to Encourage Employees to Blow
the Whistle
Given the fact that employee whistleblowers are the “single most important
18
corporate resource for detecting and preventing fraud,” it is critical to encourage
employees to blow the whistle. Not surprisingly, there are many disadvantages to
19
whistleblowing. One of the primary reasons employees are reluctant to blow the
20
whistle is the fear of employer retaliation.
1. Retaliation Examples
When Enron suddenly went into bankruptcy in 2001, it was an employee
21
who disclosed the company’s massive accounting scandal. However, many of
22
Enron’s employees knew of this accounting fraud well before Enron’s collapse.
The primary reason the Enron employees did not reveal Enron’s corporate
23
malfeasance sooner was because they did not want to lose their jobs. If adequate
whistleblower anti-retaliation laws had existed during this time period, the Enron
employees that had knowledge of the company’s securities fraud would have been
more likely to disclose and correct it before the fraud caused massive financial
losses to Enron’s shareholders, employees, and other stakeholders associated with
24
the company.
Anti-retaliation protection is even more important when you consider the
indirect effects of blowing the whistle. David Welch, the first whistleblower to
25
seek protection under the whistleblower provision of SOX, told a discouraging
story of his search for a new job five years after he blew the whistle on Cardinal
26
Bancshares. Welch, former Chief Financial Officer of Cardinal Bancshares, had
to find a new job after he was denied anti-retaliation protection post27
whistleblowing. Welch stated that “when prospective employers began to check
28
references, it was the end.”
“The bank told them I was a whistle-blower.
Prospective employers assumed I [was] not to be trusted. I have a black eye in the
accounting and banking industry . . . [i]t’s like there is a bull’s-eye painted on
17

Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 13, at 23.
KOHN, supra note 14, at 1.
19
Beller, supra note 15, at 875.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 876. “We learned from Sherron Watkins of Enron that these corporate insiders are the key
witnesses that need to be encouraged to report fraud and help prove it in court. There was no way we
could have known about this without that kind of a whistleblower.” 148 CONG. REC. 14, 447 (2002).
22
Beller, supra note 15, at 876.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A § 1514A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112207).
26
Kim, supra note 16, at 242.
27
Id.
28
Id.; Stephen Taub, Five Years Out of Work, CFO.COM (May 18, 2007), http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/9210493/l/c_9211482.
18
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29

you.”
After years of searching for a job, Welch switched careers and now
30
teaches accounting at Franklin University in Ohio. Many other whistleblowers
31
have the same disappointing story.
As a result of stories like David Welch, Congress included a whistleblower
provision, section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was enacted on July 21,
32
2010. Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act—described in more detail below—
established a whistleblower bounty program (the “Bounty Program”), which gives
employee whistleblowers a significant monetary award (referred to as “bounties”)
if they provide information to the SEC and that information meets certain
33
criteria. In addition, section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act provides a new private
right of action for whistleblowers who report information to the SEC and are
34
subsequently retaliated against. The Dodd-Frank private right of action expands
35
whistleblower protections in a number of ways. The hope is that the combination
of increased whistleblower anti-retaliation protections with the Bounty Program
will encourage employees to blow the whistle in the face of the disadvantages
36
associated with whistleblowing.
2. Practical Retaliation Relief—Economic Reinstatement
While commentators have stated that both anti-retaliation protections and
37
bounties are necessary to encourage employees to blow the whistle, it is
important to understand that the practical benefit of a successful anti-retaliation
claim is the inclusion of a monetary award. The monetary award provided by the
anti-retaliation claim is usually just enough to make the employee “whole” by
providing compensation for the future years of income lost because the employee
38
blew the whistle. The bounty, on the other hand, is an award based on the dollar
amount of SEC sanctions imposed on the whistleblower’s company as a result of

29

Id.
Kim, supra note 16, at 242.
31
Id. A former Xerox whistleblower’s lawyer stated that his client, James Bingham, “had a great
career but he’ll never get a job in Corporate America again.” Dyck, Morse & Zingales, supra note 13,
at 23.
32
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
33
Beller, supra note 15, at 914–15; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a) (West 2012). The amount of the
bounty is significant, anywhere from ten to thirty percent of monetary sanctions in excess of one million
dollars. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)–(b) (West 2012).
34
Beller, supra note 15, at 914; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a) (West 2012).
35
Beller, supra note 15, at 914; see infra Part IV.
36
Significant Number of Americans have Knowledge of Workplace Misconduct and are Willing to
Blow the Whistle, According to Labaton Sucharow Survey, LABATON SUCHAROW (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://www.labaton.com/en/about/press/Labaton-Sucharow-announced-the-results-of-its-nationwideEthics-and-Action-Survey.cfm (stating that a recent survey shows that thirty four percent of respondent
employees knew of wrongdoing in the workplace and seventy eight percent of “respondents indicated
they would report wrongdoing in the workplace if it could be done anonymously, without retaliation
and result in a monetary award.”).
37
Id.
38
Beller, supra note 15, at 876; Laurence S. Moy, et al., Whistleblower Claims Under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 1912 PLI/CORP 731, 793 (2011).
30
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39

the information the whistleblower provided.
David Welch of Cardinal Bancshares was denied anti-retaliation protection
40
under SOX. However, even if he had been successful, he would likely not have
actually been reinstated as Cardinal Bancshare’s Chief Financial Officer. Rather,
41
it is more likely he would have been awarded an economic reinstatement. Under
SOX, the economic reinstatement typically means that the employer will be
“required to pay the employee the same compensation and benefits he received
42
prior to termination,” even though the employee would not return to work.
The typical rationale for the economic equivalent of reinstatement as
opposed to actual reinstatement is that whistleblowing creates a hostile
43
environment for employees post-whistleblowing—especially for executives.
Even though there has not yet been a case under Dodd-Frank addressing this
44
economic equivalent of reinstatement issue, cases under Dodd-Frank will likely
follow a similar path. Therefore, the reinstatement laws this Article discusses are
not typically valuable because the employee is actually reinstated. However, the
reinstatement laws are extremely valuable in that they can provide the employee
with the economic equivalent of reinstatement.
III. HONESTY WAS NOT THE BEST POLICY: INTERNAL REPORTING PROHIBITED
ANTI-RETALIATION CLAIM—EGAN V. TRADINGSCREEN, INC.
While Dodd-Frank, as discussed in Parts IV and V, below, clearly expands
whistleblower anti-retaliation protections, it also fails to provide anti-retaliation
45
protection to employees of privately held companies that report internally.
Patrick Egan experienced this omission firsthand. Mr. Egan was employed by
TradingScreen, Inc. (“TradingScreen”), a privately held financial software
46
business, from 2003 until his termination in 2010.
In 2007, Mr. Egan was

39

15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2012).
Under SOX, there is a rather detailed process that a whistleblower must follow when filing for
anti-retaliation protection with the Department of Labor. First, the employee whistleblower must file
with OSHA. See generally, Robert B. Fitzpatrick, American Bar Association of Labor and Employment
Federal Labor Standards Legislation Committee 2011 Midwinter Meeting Report: Subcommittee on the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, SS032 ALI-ABA 201 (2011). OSHA’s decision can then be reviewed by
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id. Finally, the ALJ’s decision may be reviewed by the
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”). Id. It was the ARB that denied Welch’s claim for
reinstatement. Id. at 285. See infra Part IV.A.
41
See Steven F. Cherry & Thomas W. White, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Wins Reinstatement
and Monetary Damages, WILMERHALE (March 1, 2005), http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/
whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=216 (stating that “courts are generally more likely in employment
retaliation cases to award the economic equivalent of reinstatement, rather than actual reinstatement.”).
Note this article was actually referring to David Welch, because he was successful at the ALJ level.
However, his success would soon be defeated by the ARB’s ruling. Fitzpatrick, supra note 40, at 285.
42
Moy, supra note 38, at 793.
43
See Cherry & White, supra note 41.
44
Search Results on Westlaw and LexisNexis of all federal cases for “whistleblower &
reinstatement & dodd-frank” revealed no cases on the topic.
45
Joan E. McKown, Michael Dailey & Bart Green, The SEC’s Whistleblower Program and Its
Effects on Hedge Funds, 1919 PLI/CORP 193, 197 (2011).
46
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10. Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 4, 2011).
40
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promoted to the “Head of Sales for the Americas.”
In early 2009, Mr. Egan
discovered that Philippe Buhannic, Chief Executive Officer of TradingScreen,
“was diverting TradingScreen’s corporate assets to another company that he solely
owned, SpreadZero, which offered products and services similar to those of
48
TradingScreen.” Among other things, Mr. Egan alleged that Mr. Buhannic was
having TradingScreen employees do unpaid work for SpreadZero and that he was
49
stealing TradingScreen’s customers. By late 2009, Mr. Egan concluded that Mr.
Buhannic’s actions were “posing a threat to the existence of TradingScreen’s
50
business.”
In January 2010, Mr. Egan reported Mr. Buhannic’s actions to Michael Chin,
51
the President of TradingScreen. Mr. Chin subsequently passed this information
to TradingScreen’s independent directors—those not controlled by Mr.
52
Buhannic.
The independent directors had Latham Watkins LLP (“Latham”)
53
conduct an internal investigation regarding Mr. Egan’s allegations.
In March
54
2010, Latham confirmed Mr. Egan’s allegations.
On March 12, 2010, the independent directors told Mr. Buhannic that he
55
would be forced to resign. However, on March 15, 2010, Mr. Buhannic gained
56
control of the independent directors. Rather than Mr. Buhannic announcing his
resignation as originally anticipated, on June 2, 2010 he fired both Mr. Egan and
57
Mr. Chin. Soon thereafter Mr. Egan filed a complaint that asserted, among other
58
things, that he was entitled anti-retaliation protection under Dodd-Frank.
When analyzing Mr. Egan’s anti-retaliation claims, the Court noted that
59
Dodd-Frank protects whistleblowers that report information to the SEC.
Additionally, it noted that Dodd-Frank protects employees that do not report the
60
information to the SEC in other limited circumstances. Of these other limited
circumstnaces, the most common occurs when an employee whistleblower makes
61
“disclosures that are required or protected under [SOX].” However, the Court
stated that “the whistleblower provisions of [SOX] section 806 apply only to
publicly traded companies with securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 . . . or public companies required to file
62
reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act . . . .”
47

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at *3; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.A. §
78u-6(h)(1)(C) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
59
Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *3; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (West 2012).
60
Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4–5.
61
Id.; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (West 2012).
62
Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A
48
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The Court also stated that “[t]he legislative history of the Act provides little
evidence of Congress’s purpose. . . . [A]nd [it] contain[s] very few substantive
discussions of its anti-retaliation provisions. Of those few, none touch upon the
issue of whether reporting to the SEC is required for whistleblowers to avail
63
themselves of the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions.” Ultimately, the Court held
that while Dodd-Frank would have protected Mr. Egan from TradingScreen’s
retaliation if he had reported the information to the SEC, the protection was
unavailable to him in this instance because he only reported Mr. Buhannic’s
64
actions internally.
In addition to the holding above, the Court stated that “reporting” should be
construed broadly. Thus, the Court said that Mr. Egan could possibly qualify for
protections under Dodd-Frank if he could prove that: “(1) he initiated the inquiry
into the violation; and (2) the information that he disclosed to [Latham] was
65
actually reported to the SEC.” If Mr. Egan could prove these two elements, then
it could be said that he “jointly” reported the information to the SEC and he would
66
be afforded the anti-retaliation protections under Dodd-Frank. While the Court
granted Mr. Egan relief to amend his complaint to plead facts that show the
information was transmitted to the SEC, the TradingScreen II court held that Mr.
Egan failed to show that the SEC actually received the information. Thus, Mr.
67
Egan was not granted anti-retaliation protection under Dodd-Frank.
The detailed facts and holding of TradingScreen set out above are troubling
to both private companies and their prospective whistleblower employees. If
Congress has provided protection to employee whistleblowers of privately held
companies when they report securities laws violations to the SEC, surely it should
also provide protection if the same employee reports the identical information
internally. The remainder of this paper will set forth and analyze in detail the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions. However this issue of internal reporting
protection for private company employees has never been addressed. Congress
must address this issue in order for private company employees to believe that
honesty is still the best policy.

(West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
63
Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *4.
64
Id. at *5; McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45, at 198–99.
65
McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45, at 198–99; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066 at, *7–9.
66
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6) (West 2012).
67
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 4344067, at *3–4
(“TradingScreen II”).
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IV. PRIVATE COMPANY INTERNAL REPORTING LOOPHOLE: BACKGROUND ON
68
FEDERAL ANTI-RETALIATION PROTECTIONS
A. Whistleblower Laws Pre-Dodd-Frank
Prior to the enactment of Dodd-Frank in 2010, the most significant
expansion of securities-related whistleblower anti-retaliation protections occurred
69
after scandals in 2001, such as Enron, when Congress passed SOX in 2002.
SOX’s whistleblower protection provisions set forth in section 806 provided anti70
retaliation protection to employees of publicly traded companies that blew the
71
whistle. At that time, a SOX public company was defined as a company with a
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act or a company
72
that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
73
Currently, section 806 forbids public companies from retaliating against an
employee who reports securities law violations to a federal regulatory or law
enforcement agency, any member or committee of Congress, or a person with
74
supervisory authority over the employee (i.e. internal reporting). An employee is
protected under section 806, even if he was incorrect about the corporate
75
malfeasance, if he had a “reasonable belief” that corporate wrongdoing occurred.
While the protection SOX affords public company whistleblower employees
appears to be great, two other provisions significantly limit the protections. First,
the employee has a very limited time period in which to file a claim. Under preDodd-Frank SOX, an employee had to file a complaint alleging retaliation with the
76
Department of Labor (“DOL”) within ninety days of the retaliatory act.
After
filing a complaint, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”)
(an agency of the DOL), not a federal district court, will review the
77
whistleblower’s complaint. This is problematic for a couple of reasons. First,
under this system there are many levels of review, which can draw the litigation
78
out.
OHSA’s decision can be appealed to an Administrative Law Judge
79
(“ALJ”).
The ALJ’s decision can be appealed to the Administrative Review

68
It is important to note that there are state whistleblower protections, but state laws do not provide
sufficient anti-retaliation protection for private company employees who report internally. See Part
VII.B, below.
69
Beller, supra note 15, at 903; Dan Ackman, Sherron Watkins Had Whistle, but Blew It, FORBES
(Feb. 14, 2002, 3:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2002/02/14/0214watkins.html.
70
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112207).
71
Beller, supra note 15, at 904; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2012).
72
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2012).
73
Retaliation means “any discharge, demotion, suspension, threat, harassment, or any other
discrimination against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful
act done by the employee.” Id.
74
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1) (West 2012).
75
Id.; Beller, supra note 15, at 906.
76
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (West 2012); Beller, supra note 15, at 904. Dodd-Frank
extended this time period. See Part IV.B.
77
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b) (Westlaw); Beller, supra note 15, at 904–05.
78
Kim, supra note 16, at 253; see generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 40.
79
See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 40.
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80

Finally, the ARB’s decision can be appealed to the United
Board (“ARB”).
81
States Court of Appeals in the circuit “where the alleged violation occurred.”
Second, it is problematic because OSHA is inexperienced in dealing with security
82
law claims.
Still, it was clear even before Dodd-Frank that publicly traded
company employees were afforded at least some protection under SOX if they
thought it was necessary to blow the whistle.
B. Dodd-Frank
1. Enhanced Protections in Section 806 of SOX
Dodd-Frank revised section 806 of SOX to expand whistleblower protections
in two important ways. First, it increased the time in which a whistleblower could
83
file a complaint from ninety days to one hundred eighty days. Additionally, it
amended section 806 of SOX to protect employees of any subsidiary or affiliate of
a public company whose financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of such company, or in a nationally recognized statistical
84
rating organization. These two provisions significantly expanded whistleblower
anti-retaliation protections under SOX.
2. Report to SEC—Public and Private Company Employees Protected
In addition to the added protections under section 806 of SOX, Dodd-Frank
85
creates a new private right of action to help whistleblowers combat retaliation.
In contrast to section 806 of SOX, under the new Dodd-Frank private right of
action, an employee whistleblower can bypass the DOL and file an anti-retaliation
86
complaint directly in the proper federal district court. Further, the Dodd-Frank
87
private right of action gives whistleblowers a very generous statute of limitations.
Specifically, section 922(h)(1)(B)(iii) states that a claim under this section cannot
be brought more than six years after the date on which the qualified discrimination
occurred or more than three years after the date when facts material to the qualified
discrimination are known or reasonably should have been known by the
88
employee.
Expanding the window of time for whistleblowers will reduce the
chances that they will be retaliated against simply because they do not immediately
file a complaint.
80

Id.
Id. at 263. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact that an employee can file for de novo review
in a federal district court if the DOL has not issued a final decision within 180 days. However, this
process is still time-consuming and confusing. See Kim, supra note 16, at 253.
82
Kim, supra note 16, at 253. These are just two of the many reasons that it is problematic for
employees to file with the DOL. For more details, see Kim, supra note 16, at 251–53.
83
Beller, supra note 15, at 914; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 1057 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1514A(b)(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207).
84
18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2012).
85
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h) (West 2012).
86
Id.; Beller, supra note 15, at 914.
87
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (West 2012).
88
Id.
81
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A whistleblower is eligible for anti-retaliation protections afforded under
89
section 922 of Dodd-Frank if he: (1) possesses a reasonable belief that the
information he is providing relates to a possible securities law violation that has
90
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur and (2) provides that information in a
91
manner described in section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act.
Section
21F(h)(1)(A) states that:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms
and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section [or]
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related to such
92
information.

According to section 21F(h)(1)(A)(i) and (ii), the new private right of action
applies to whistleblower employees of both public and privately held companies as
93
long as the employee reports the suspected malfeasance to the SEC.
The TradingScreen court acknowledged this new private right of action for
private company employees when it stated that Mr. Egan would have been
protected under Dodd-Frank if he had reported Mr. Buchannic’s actions to the
94
SEC. It is clear from the plain statutory language of section 922 of Dodd-Frank
that an employee of a privately held company can bring an anti-retaliation claim
under section 922 of Dodd-Frank if that employee reports his knowledge of
corporate malfeasance to the SEC.
3. Internal Reports—Private Company Employees Unprotected

95

Even though Dodd-Frank clearly provides a private right of action to a

89

Proclamation No. 113, 76 Fed. Reg. 34303 (June 13, 2011).
The “reasonable belief” standard requires that the employee hold a subjectively
genuine belief that the information demonstrates a possible violation, and that
this belief is one that a similarly situated employee might reasonably possess. We
believe that requiring a ‘reasonable belief’ on the part of a whistleblower seeking
anti-retaliation protection strikes the appropriate balance between encouraging
individuals to provide us with high- quality tips without fear of retaliation, on the
one hand, while not encouraging bad faith or frivolous reports, or permitting
abuse of the anti-retaliation protections, on the other.

Id.
90
Note that this definition provides whistleblowers eligible for protection under Dodd-Frank
broader protections for reporting than under SOX section 806. This is because the reasonable belief
does not have to be about a violation that has occurred. Rather, it could also be a reasonable belief
about a possible violation that is ongoing or is about to occur.
91
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (West 2012). Also, it is important to note that the anti-retaliation
protections apply whether or not the whistleblower qualifies for the Bounty Program. Securities
Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(ii) (2011).
92
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(h) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
93
Id.
94
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10. Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May
4, 2011).
95
It is also important to note that the SEC, in addition to the individual whistleblower, can bring a
federal anti-retaliation action under section 922 of Dodd-Frank. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(2).
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private company whistleblower who reports corporate wrongdoing to the SEC, it is
silent on anti-retaliation protections for private company whistleblowers that report
internally. As discussed above, in order to be afforded federal anti-retaliation
protection under Dodd-Frank, an employee must provide information in a manner
described in 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act. Subsection (i) and (ii) of this
section are set forth in Part IV.B.2., above.
Section 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii), the final “manner” described in that section, states:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms
and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower . . . (iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.), including section 10A(m) of such Act (15
U.S.C. 78f(m)), section 1513(e) of title 18, United States Code, and any other law,
96
rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.

While the last two methods stated in 21F(h)(1)(A)(iii) could potentially
afford a private company employee with standing to bring a federal anti-retaliation
97
claim against his employer, those situations are limited.
The other methods
98
generally only provide anti-retaliation protection to public company employees.
In fact, Dodd-Frank does not explicitly provide anti-retaliation protection for
99
internal reporting at all. Rather, internal reporting anti-retaliation protection is
100
derived from the language in section 922 that references SOX.
As stated in Part
IV.A. above, section 806 of SOX prohibits public companies from retaliating
against an employee who reports corporate wrongdoing to a person with
101
supervisory authority over the employee (i.e. internal reporting).
The Practicing Law Institute (the “PLI”) recognized this internal reporting
102
More
problem when it was analyzing Dodd-Frank’s impact on hedge funds.
specifically, the PLI noted in a November 2011 article that the “SEC has not yet
provided protections to employees of private companies, including hedge funds,
against retaliation for internally reporting. The anti-retaliation provisions under
Dodd-Frank for internal reporting apply only to employees of public
103
companies.”
The Federal Register also noted the absence of internal reporting
96

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F(h)(1)(A)(iii).
See generally Egan, 2011 WL 1672066.
98
See Howard E. Berkenblit & Stacy H. Louizos, SEC’s Whistleblower Program Finalized,
BUSINESS LAW TODAY (July 14, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/2011/07/keep
ingcurrent-securities2.shtml (stating that “whistleblowers who make disclosures that are required or
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Securities Exchange Act, or any other law subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC will generally only be protected if their tips pertain to public companies.”).
99
Tammy Marzigliano & Jordan A. Thomas, Advocacy and Counsel for the SEC Whistleblower,
BNA DAILY LABOR REPORT (Oct. 11, 2011), http://knowledgenetwork.labaton.com/Advocacy-andCounsel.cfm (stating that “[i]t is critically important that employee advocates understand that despite
the financial incentives offered by the SEC, internal reporting does not entitle an individual to the antiretaliation protections of Dodd-Frank.”).
100
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L.
112-207).
101
Id.
102
McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45.
103
Id. at 197.
97
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104

protection for private company whistleblowers.
There is some room for interpretation in this new private right of action, as
105
If an employee can prove that he has acted
demonstrated in TradingScreen.
“jointly” with another individual who reported the alleged violations to the SEC
(or his company subsequently reported such information), then he might also be
106
eligible for protection under section 922.
However, as demonstrated in
TradingScreen, this is hard to prove in practice. In sum, while Dodd-Frank clearly
provides private company whistleblowers with anti-retaliation protection when
they report corporate wrongdoing to the SEC, it is equally obvious that the same
employees are not provided anti-retaliation protection when they report identical
information internally.
V. SO WHAT’S THE BIG DEAL? OUR JOB IS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC
Given the traditional public policy determination that public investors justify
federal securities laws, a push for greater anti-retaliation protection for private
107
company whistleblowers may seem unusual.
However, in light of the fact that
(1) anti-fraud provisions apply to publicly and privately traded companies, (2)
Dodd-Frank allows private company whistleblowers to be eligible for a bounty
under the Bounty Program, and (3) Dodd-Frank provides anti-retaliation protection
to private company whistleblowers that report to the SEC, it makes no sense not to
protect private company employees from anti-retaliation for internally reporting.
A. Current Anti-Fraud Provisions
As stated above, Dodd-Frank does not address internal reporting at all.
Rather, it refers to the internal reporting protections SOX provides. However,
those protections only apply to public company employees. In contrast, many
other federal whistleblower laws provide different types of whistleblowers (i.e.
health and safety whistleblowers) with anti-retaliation protection, whether they
108
work at a private or public company.
SOX’s whistleblower protections
probably omit private company whistleblowers because of the traditional public
109
policy determination that public investors justify securities laws.

104

Proclamation No. 113, 76 Fed. Reg. 34304 (June 13, 2011). The Federal Register noted this
limitation when it stated “the retaliation protections for internal reporting afforded by Section
21F(h)(1)(A) do not broadly apply to employees of entities other than public companies.” Id.
105
Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc., No. 10. Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL 1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4,
2011); see also McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45, at 198 (stating “[t]he court reasoned that the
employee could potentially qualify as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank if he could show that: (1) he
initiated the inquiry into the violation; and (2) the information that he disclosed to outside counsel was
actually reported to the SEC.”).
106
Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *7–9; see also McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45, at 198
and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)(6)
(West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207) and Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17
C.F.R. 240.21F-2(a) (2011).
107
Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 OHIO ST.
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 144 (2011).
108
See The Whistleblower Protection Program, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
109
Gedicks, supra note 9, at 585.
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However, private companies are also subject to numerous securities laws.
In fact, anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to private as well
111
as public companies.
The SEC, in an enforcement action taken against Stiefel
112
Labs on December 12, 2011, reiterated this reality.
In that case the SEC stated
that “the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to all securities
transactions—whether the securities in question are issued by a public or private
113
company.”
Even without considering the incentives Dodd-Frank creates
through the Bounty Program and federal anti-relation protections, described in Part
V.B. and C., below, it would make sense to extend federal anti-retaliation
protection to private company employees that report internally simply because
private companies are already subject to the anti-fraud provisions of federal
securities laws.
B. Bounty Program
As stated above, Dodd-Frank created a new Bounty Program that requires
the SEC to pay bounties to individuals who voluntarily provide original
114
information to the SEC when that information meets certain criteria.
Most
importantly, the whistleblower is eligible for a bounty if the original information
he voluntarily discloses to the SEC leads to monetary sanctions of at least one
115
million dollars.
While the SEC has discretion to determine the amount of the
bounty, it must be at least ten percent and cannot be more than thirty percent of the
116
monetary sanctions collected.
Compliance with internal reporting procedures is a factor the SEC will use to
117
Under the final SEC rules regarding
help determine the amount of the bounty.
Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision (“Final Rules”), a whistleblower’s
participation in internal compliance systems is a factor that can increase the
118
amount of the bounty.
Alternatively, interference with internal compliance and

110

See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa (2006).
James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §12.9 (3d.
ed. 2011) (stating that 10b-5’s “breadth is great as it applies to any security, regardless of whether the
security is subject to the [Exchange] Act’s registration and reporting requirements.”).
112
See Erika L. Robinson, et al., SEC Reaffirms the Broad Reach of Rule 10b-5 to Private
Companies,
WILMERHALE
(Dec.
22,
2011),
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx? publication=9999.
113
See id.; see also Cox & Hazen, supra note 111 and accompanying text.
114
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2) (2011). For
more details regarding criteria see 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3 (stating that as limited by the requirements of
§§ 240.21F-2, 240.21F-8, and 240.21F-16, the Commission pays awards to whistleblowers that: “(1)
Voluntarily provide the Commission (2) With original information (3) That leads to the successful
enforcement by the Commission of a Federal court or administrative action (4) In which the
Commission obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.”).
115
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 922,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-207). Note that under the Final Rules, “the
SEC will aggregate two or more smaller actions that arise from a set of common facts in order to meet
the $1,000,000 threshold for an award.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(d)(1).
116
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(b) (West 2012).
117
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)–(b).
118
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
111
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reporting systems is a factor that can decrease the amount of the bounty.
However, participation or interference with internal compliance systems are just
two factors, among many, that the SEC uses to determine the amount of the
120
bounty.
The type of employee eligible for an award is another important criteria to
examine. Unlike section 806 of SOX, Dodd-Frank does not limit the Bounty
121
It follows that the Bounty Program
Program to public company employees.
122
applies to both public and private companies.
Therefore, while private company
employees are not afforded federal anti-retaliation protection for internally
reporting, they are eligible to receive a hefty bounty if they report the information
to the SEC.
C. Anti-Retaliation Protection
Although discussed in detail above, it is important to reiterate the fact that
private company whistleblowers are only likely to receive federal anti-retaliation
123
protection, in the form of economic reinstatement, if they report to the SEC.
There are currently few incentives for a private company whistleblower to comply
124
with internal reporting procedures before going to the SEC.
In fact, the PLI
stated:
Employees, even at companies where official policy compels that wrongdoing be
reported and investigated, may downplay internal reports of wrongdoing . . . in
order to avoid possible retaliation. At the very extreme, the current state of the case
law and statutory language strongly suggest [that a private company whistleblower]
may bypass internal compliance and report directly to the SEC in order to save his
125
or her job.

In sum, the current state of the law almost obligates a well-informed private
company employee who wants federal anti-retaliation protection to bypass internal
reporting procedures and report violations directly to the SEC.

119

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)–(b).
121
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 806, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112207); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6 (West 2012).
122
See generally McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a) (West 2012);
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a) (in defining whistleblower, nowhere does it say that they have to be a public
employee like SOX section 806 does). See also Lucienne M. Hartmann, Whistle While Your Work: The
Fairytale-Like Whistleblower Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the
Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L REV. 1279, 1288 (stating that “[i]n general, the Dodd-Frank Act states that
a whistleblower who provides ‘original information’ of a fraudulent act by a public or privately held
company leading to a monetary sanction of at least $1 million will be rewarded 10%–30% of the
monetary sanction.”) (emphasis added).
123
See Part IV.B.
124
McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45, at 199.
125
Id.
120
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VI. SPAGHETTI BOWL OF LAWS CREATES UNCERTAINTY AND UNREALIZED
EXPECTATIONS
The private company whistleblower framework described above is a mess.
Before blowing the whistle, a prospective private company whistleblower must
decide if he wants to comply with his company’s internal reporting procedures or
not. As demonstrated in TradingScreen, if he does comply with internal reporting
procedures without also reporting to the SEC, he risks possible retaliation without
federal anti-retaliation protection. However, if he goes straight to the SEC, he can
be sure that he will be afforded federal anti-retaliation protection.
A prospective whistleblower must also consider internal reporting in regards
to the size of a possible bounty. Under the Final Rules, the SEC will consider
compliance with internal reporting as a factor to increase or decrease an award.
However, as demonstrated by David Welch’s story, a well-informed whistleblower
will likely choose a smaller bounty if it means that he will also receive federal antiretaliation protection (i.e., economic reinstatement). If he reports directly to the
SEC, a prospective whistleblower will receive a monetary reinstatement award as
well as a minimum of ten percent of sanctions the SEC imposed even if he does
not report internally before reporting to the SEC. Therefore, under the current
state of the law, a well-informed private company employee is encouraged to
bypass internal compliance procedures and report directly to the SEC.
What about an employee who is not well-informed? It seems there are at
least two adverse outcomes that could result. First, an employee who cannot
afford an attorney might decide that the effort he must put into understanding the
laws outweighs any benefits he might gain from blowing the whistle. Even if he
does have the money to seek advice, he might decide the cost of an attorney’s
advice outweighs the benefits gained from blowing the whistle. Clearly providing
federal anti-retaliation protection to private company employees who report
internally could decrease the information costs associated with this decision.
Alternatively, unclear and inconsistent protections, as the current law provides,
could lead to fewer whistleblower reports and thus dilute Dodd-Frank’s purpose in
regards to private company employees.
Even worse, a prospective whistleblower who is not well informed might
blow the whistle internally under the impression that he will receive federal antiretaliation protection. This is a plausible expectation given the fact that the SEC
has stated the amount of the bounty will increase if a whistleblower first reports
internally. If such an employee internally blows the whistle and is fired before he
informs the SEC, similar to Mr. Egan in TradingScreen, he might lose his job
126
without any protection at all.
Stories like this might, in turn, discourage other
employees from reporting internally, thus, leading to the breakdown of private
companies’ internal compliance systems.

126

Some states provide protections, see Part VII.B., below—but state laws are inconsistent and
usually do not provide protection for internal reporting.
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VII. PROBLEM FOR PRIVATE EMPLOYERS
A. Internal Compliance Threatened
As described above, well-informed employees of privately held companies
have great incentives to bypass internal reporting procedures and report violations
directly to the SEC. This is because if a private company whistleblower goes
straight to the SEC, he is not only afforded federal anti-retaliation protection that is
not available to him if he only reports internally, but he is also eligible for a hefty
bounty. This problem does not exist to the same extent for prospective public
company whistleblowers because section 806 of SOX provides at least some antiretaliation protection for internally reporting. There does not seem to be a good
reason for this distinction. By practically mandating well-informed private
company employees to bypass internal reporting procedures and report directly to
the SEC, the internal reporting loophole could completely destroy the purpose and
127
effectiveness of private company internal compliance programs.
The internal reporting incentives in the Final Rules will probably not be
enough to incentivize a well-informed prospective private company whistleblower
to report internally because he might be fired before he reports the information to
the SEC, and he is already guaranteed ten percent of the SEC sanctions anyway.
To make existing internal reporting incentives have an effect on prospective
private company whistleblowers decisions and to prevent the breakdown of private
companies’ internal compliance programs, private company employees need
federal anti-retaliation protection for internal reporting.
B. State Law Anti-Retaliation Protections’ Insufficiencies
One could argue that states, and not the federal government, should provide
anti-retaliation protection for private company whistleblowers that only report
internally. Though many states do have whistleblower laws, the lack of
consistency among the states with respect to the breadth and scope of protection
128
make these protections insufficient.
The main reason state protections are insufficient is because of the lack of
129
Most importantly, not every state
consistency throughout the state laws.
130
provides whistleblower protections.
As of 2009, Arizona, Arkansas, Texas, and
the District of Columbia were among the thirteen states and federal districts that
provided no whistleblower protections whatsoever.
States that do provide state whistleblower protections have a variety of
131
132
differences.
Some states only protect state or government employees.
Others
127

See generally McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45, at 199.
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, State Whistleblower Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx (last updated
Nov. 2009).
129
Elizabeth Mihalek, Note, The Employee-Whistleblower and the Decision to Expose Corporate
Fraud: Show Me the Money, 17 No. 4 PIABA B.J. 401, 402 (2010).
130
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 128.
131
Id.; Mihalek, supra note 129, at 406 (stating that state laws provided “piecemeal” protection).
132
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 128.
128
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protect employees of all types (including privately held companies). Still others
133
only protect health care employees.
In addition to differing on the type of employers the whistleblower laws
apply to, states differ on the type of protections provided. Some states, even those
that apply to all employers, only protect employees if they report a violation to a
134
135
government or law enforcement agency.
Others mandate internal reporting.
Based on the variety of inconsistent state approaches to whistleblower protections,
including thirteen states that provide no protection at all, clearly most private
company whistleblower employees that want to report internally cannot rely on
state protections. Moreover, private company employers cannot rely on state law
protections to protect the integrity of their internal compliance programs. Even
with the limited protections in some states, a well-informed whistleblower will
surely bypass its employer’s internal compliance program and report directly to the
SEC in order to be eligible for the federal bounty and anti-retaliation protection.
C. Internal Anti-Retaliation Policies Insufficient
In response to Dodd-Frank’s Bounty Program, many commentators have
136
urged companies to enhance their internal compliance systems.
However, even
though there may be robust internal compliance policies, well-informed
prospective private company whistleblowers will likely bypass internal compliance
and report directly to the SEC to: (1) receive federal anti-retaliation protection (i.e.
an economic reinstatement award) or (2) become eligible for a large bounty. Even
though creating strong internal compliance systems is a noble goal, the current
state of the law practically mandates private company employees to undermine
such goal.

133
134
135
136

Id.
Id.
Id.
See McKown, Dailey & Green, supra note 45; Berkenblit & Louizos, supra note 98.
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VIII. SOLUTION
A. Provide Internal Anti-Retaliation Protection for Private Company
Employees
The best solution is to provide federal anti-retaliation protection to private
company employees that report internally. While there are critics of Dodd-Frank’s
extension of anti-retaliation protection to private company employees because of
137
the increase in cost to the federal government, extending protection to private
company whistleblowers that report internally should not add to this cost. This is
because a well-informed whistleblower would report to the SEC either at the same
time or before reporting internally. Since this whistleblower would likely report to
the SEC at some point, the federal government will not avoid that anti-retaliation
138
cost.
More importantly, extending federal anti-protection to private company
whistleblowers that report internally helps prevent the destruction of private
company internal compliance programs. This is because providing prospective
whistleblower employees with a federal economic reinstatement award
incentivizes them to report internally to a higher degree than the current law.
Without this added protection, the incentives Dodd-Frank creates for private
company employees to report to the SEC will likely breakdown internal
139
compliance programs.
B. Eliminate Private Companies from Dodd-Frank Altogether
At present, well-informed private company whistleblowers practically have
no other option than to report to the SEC either before or at the same time they
report internally. This is mainly due to the Bounty Program and the federal antiretaliation protections described above. As previously stated, this leaves private
company internal compliance programs hopeless. Thus, if Congress does not pass
federal anti-retaliation protection for private company employees that report
internally, it should not provide any federal protection or bounties to private
company employees. Though this solution is harsh, and should not be the first
choice, it may be necessary in order to preserve the integrity of private company
internal compliance programs.
C. Middle Ground—“Big Enough” Private Company
The typical rationale for limiting protections to publicly traded employees is
140
that securities fraud at private companies does not pose a threat to society.
In
other words, public dollars should not be spent on protecting private companies.
137

Ebersole, supra note 107, at 144–45.
This is unless, of course, prospective private company whistleblowers with federal antiretaliation protection would be more likely to report internally than to the SEC. This is something that
would have to be determined after the protection was afforded.
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However, private companies are rapidly increasing in size. Household names,
141
such as MARS (and, until recently, Facebook), are privately held companies.
An unrevealed fraud at these companies, which would result in many losses in
jobs, could be as detrimental to society as the downfall of Enron. Thus, if
Congress will not provide federal anti-retaliation protection to all private company
whistleblowers that report internally, it should at least provide it to privately held
companies that are “big enough.”
This test could be similar to the test in section 12(g) of the Securities and
142
Exchange Act of 1934.
Section 12(g) provides that a company must register
with the SEC and submit to its continuous disclosure system if it has both: (1) ten
143
million dollars of assets and (2) five hundred shareholders of record.
Many
companies, such as Facebook, have avoided section 12(g) requirements because of
144
the five hundred shareholders of record requirement.
Therefore, I would
propose a similar, but different, test to determine if a private company is “big
enough” so that its employees could be provided anti-retaliation protection for
reporting internally.
Rather than have two-pronged test as section 12(g) of the Exchange Act
does, I suggest that if the private company has a certain amount of assets, or a
certain number employees, or meets a combination of both requirements, then its
employees could have federal anti-retaliation protection for internal reporting.
This “size” test makes sense even under the rationale that the federal government
should only protect the public. This is because bigger companies have more assets
and employ more people and thus, securities fraud within larger private companies
will have a large impact on the economy and employment as a whole. If Congress
provides federal anti-retaliation protection to private company employees that
report to the SEC, then it should also provide federal anti-retaliation protection to
private company employees who report internally. However, if Congress must
draw a line due to the public protection rationale, then a size test of this sort makes
the most sense.
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Andrea Murphy, America’s Largest Private Companies: Food (Nov. 17, 2011, 7:37 AM),
FORBES.COM,
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IX. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that whistleblowers play a critical role in revealing and
preventing corporate fraud. Thus, it is necessary to provide prospective
whistleblower employees with incentives to blow the whistle. It seems the most
important incentive, due partly to inconsistent state law protections and employer
retaliation, is to provide whistleblowers with federal anti-retaliation protection.
Even though it is important to encourage prospective whistleblowers to blow
the whistle, the incentives provided should not encourage whistleblowers to
undermine their companies’ internal compliance system. The combination of a
lack of internal reporting protection for private company employees, and the
incentives Dodd-Frank creates for private company employees to report to the
SEC, do just that—they practically leave well-informed private company
whistleblowers with no choice but to undermine their company’s internal
compliance system. This problem does not exist to the same extent for public
company employees because SOX provides whistleblowers with at least some
protection for internal reporting.
In order to fix the private company internal reporting loophole created by the
current whistleblower laws, Congress must provide private company employees
with at least as much federal anti-retaliation protection as public company
employees receive under SOX. If Congress chooses not to afford private company
employees with federal anti-retaliation protection for internal reporting, then the
Dodd-Frank Bounty Program and federal private right of action should not apply to
them either. However, since many private companies are just as important to the
public as many public companies are, if Congress chooses not to provide federal
anti-retaliation protection for internal reporting to all private companies, then it
should at least provide such protection to those companies that are “big enough.”
If one of these solutions is not implemented, then it is only a matter of time before
private company employees begin to become aware of the current whistleblower
laws and incentives, and private companies’ internal compliance systems collapse.

